# Multi-player minimum cost flow problems with nonconvex costs and integer flows

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### Network Flow Problems

- *Network flow problems*: optimization problems associated with underlying directed network.
- They arise in numerous application settings and in many forms.
- Some common application areas: communication networks, transportation system, social network, power system, electro-mechanical systems *etc.*
- *The minimum cost flow problem* is the most fundamental among network flow problems.

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### Minimum Cost Flow Problem



### Minimum Cost Flow Problem

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize}_{x} & \sum_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}} c_{i} f_{i}(x_{i}) & \texttt{Pefault Case:} & f_{i}(x_{i}) = x_{i} \texttt{*} \texttt{} \\ \text{subject to} & Ax = b & (1) \\ & 0 \leq x \leq u \\ & x \in \mathbf{Z}^{n}. \end{array}$$

- Here, the network has n arcs, m+1 nodes.
- A : reduced node-arc incidence matrix, dimension  $m \times n$ , full row rank.
- We re-index the *m* linearly independent columns of *A* as the first *m* columns.
- *b* : represents supplies to the nodes at different points.
- *u* : upper bound vector for the flow.

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### Extension of Min. Cost Flow to a Multi-player Setup

- With each arc of the network graph we associate one player.
- Each of the players is trying to minimize its nonconvex cost function, subject to the network flow constraints.
- Our goal is to seek an efficient solution concept in this multi-player problem.



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The goal of the *i*th player for *i* ∈ [*n*] = {1,...,*n*}, given other players' strategies x<sub>-i</sub> ∈ Z<sup>n-1</sup>, is to solve:

minimize<sub>xi</sub>  $f_i(x_i) \land \text{proper: practically can be anything} \land$ subject to  $A(x_i, x_{-i}) = b \land \text{The constraints}$  $0 \preceq (x_i, x_{-i}) \preceq u$  couple the players $\land$  (2)  $x \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ .

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### Solution Concepts in Consideration

- A *vector optimal solution* that minimizes all the objectives simultaneously is unlikely to exist.
- The celebrated *Nash equilibrium* is also not very efficient in our setup because:
  - the constraint set of the problem has equality constraints, thus making any feasible point a Nash equilibrium, and
  - posteriori some of the players may decide to deviate from the Nash equilibrium in order to reduce their costs even more at the expense of the rest of the players.
- A more effective solution concept is the *Pareto optimal point*.

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A *Pareto optimal point* is a solution concept where none of the objective functions can be improved without worsening some of the other objective values.

#### Definition

(**Pareto Optimal Point**) In problem 2, a point  $x^* \in P$  is Pareto optimal if it satisfies the following: there *does not* exist another point  $\tilde{x} \in P$  such that

 $(\forall i \in [n]) \quad f_i(\tilde{x}_i) \leq f_i(x_i^*),$ 

with at least one index  $j \in [n]$  satisfying  $f_j(\tilde{x}_j) < f_j(x_i^*)$ .

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### Related Work

- Our problem setup does not seem to be investigated in existing literature.
- Nonconvex network flow problems for very specific cost functions (Magnanti1984, Graves1985, Daskin2011, He2015).
- Integer multi-commodity flow problems (Brunetta2000, Ozdaglar2004).

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#### Theorem

(Existence of a decoupling variable) Denote  $B = [A_1|A_2|\cdots|A_m]$ . The equality constraint set  $Q = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \mid Ax = b\}$  is nonempty and for any vector  $x, x \in Q$  is equivalent to saying that there exists a  $z \in \mathbb{Z}^{n-m}$  such that

$$x = (d_1 - h_1^T z, \dots, d_m - h_m^T z, z_1, \dots, z_{n-m}),$$
(3)

where  $d_i$  is the *i*th component of  $d = B^{-1}b$ , and  $h_i^T \in \mathbf{Z}^{n-m}$  is the *i*th row of  $B^{-1}A_{[1:m,m+1:n]}$ .

### Decoupled Problems for the n-m Players

• In z we can decouple the optimization problems for players  $m+1, m+2, \ldots, n$  as follows

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize}_{z_i} & f_i(z_i) \\ \text{subject to} & 0 \leq z_i \leq u_i \\ & z_i \in \mathbf{Z}. \end{array}$$

• Set of different optimal solutions for player m + i for  $i \in [n - m]$  is

$$D_i = \{z_{i,1}, z_{i,2}, \ldots, z_{i,p_i}\}.$$

• Define,  $D = \times_{i=1}^{n-m} D_i \neq \emptyset$ 

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- We provide each player i ∈ [m] with its own local copy of z, denoted by z<sup>(i)</sup> ∈ Z<sup>n-m</sup>, which acts as its decision variable.
- For any  $i \in [m]$ ,  $x_i = d_i h_i^T z^{(i)}$ .
- The copy  $z^{(i)}$  has to be in *consensus* with the rest of the first *m* players:

$$z^{(i)} = z^{(j)} \quad \forall j \in [m] \setminus \{i\}.$$

- The copy  $z^{(i)}$  has to satisfy the *flow bound constraints*, *i.e.*,  $0 \le d_i h_i^T z^{(i)} \le u_i$  for all  $i \in [m]$ .
- For the last n m players  $z_i \in D_i$ , so:

$$z^{(i)} \in D$$

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For all  $i \in [m]$ , the *i*th player's optimization problem in variable  $z^{(i)}$  can be written as:

minimize<sub>z(i)</sub> 
$$\overline{f}_i(z^{(i)}) = f_i(d_i - h_i^T z^{(i)})$$
  
subject to  $z^{(i)} = z^{(j)}, \quad j \in [m] \setminus \{i\}$   
 $0 \le d_i - h_i^T z^{(i)} \le u_i$   
 $z^{(i)} \in D.$ 
(5)

$$q_i(z^{(i)}) = (d_i - h_i^T z^{(i)})(d_i - h_i^T z^{(i)} - 1) \cdots (d_i - h_i^T z^{(i)} - u_i) = 0,$$
(6)

$$r_j(z^{(i)}) = (z_j^{(i)} - z_{j,1})(z_j^{(i)} - z_{j,2})\dots(z_j^{(i)} - z_{j,p_i}) = 0, \qquad j \in [n-m].$$
(7)

 $\mathscr{F} = \{z \in \mathbf{Z}^{n-m} \mid (\forall k \in [m]) \ q_k(z) = 0, (\forall j \in [n-m]) \ r_j(z) = 0\}.$ 

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For  $i \in [m]$ , *i.e.*, each of these players are optimizing over a *common* constraint set  $\mathscr{F}$ :

minimize<sub>z(i)</sub> 
$$\overline{f}_i(z^{(i)})$$
  
subject to  $z^{(i)} \in \mathscr{F}$ .

- When  ${\mathscr F}$  is nonempty? How to find the points in it?
- A little algebraic geometry will take us a long way...

(8)

### A Little Algebraic Geometry

• The *ideal* generated by polynomials  $f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_m \in \mathbf{C}[x]$  is the set

ideal 
$$\{f_1,\ldots,f_m\} = \left\{\sum_{i=1}^m h_i f_i \mid (\forall i \in [m]) \ h_i \in \mathbf{C}[x]\right\}.$$

 $\$  analogous to span of vectors  $\$ 

- A Groebner basis G<sub>≻</sub> is particular kind of generating set of an ideal I over a field C[x] \\* analogous to basis set of a span\*\
- *Reduced Groebner basis G*<sub>reduced,≻</sub> is the most compact Groebner basis for an ideal *I*. \\* analogous to orthonormal basis of a span \*\
- There are many computer algebra packages to compute reduced Groebner basis such as Macaulry2, SINGULAR, FGb, Maple, Mathematica *etc.*

#### Theorem

The set  $\mathscr{F}$  is nonempty if and only

 $G_{reduced,\succ} \neq \{1\},\$ 

where  $G_{reduced,\succ}$  is the reduced Groebner basis of ideal  $\{q_1, \ldots, q_m, r_1, \ldots, r_{n-m}\}$  with respect to any ordering.

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### Computing Points in ${\mathscr F}$

$$G_{n-m-i} = G_{reduced,\succ_{lex}} \cap \mathbf{C}[z_{n-m-i+1}, z_{n-m-i+2}, \ldots, z_{n-m}].$$

#### Theorem

 $G_0 = \mathscr{F}$ .

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### Finding the Pareto optimal points from ${\mathscr F}$

for  $i \in [m]$  $X_i := d_i - h_i^T \mathscr{F}$  \\* The inverse operator is denoted  $X_i^{-1}$  \*\ end for

Sort the elements of the  $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^m$ s with respect to cardinality of the elements in a descending order.

Denote the index set of the sorted set by  $\{s_1,\ldots,s_m\}$  such that

 $|X|_{s_1} \geq \cdots \geq |X|_{s_m}.$ for  $i \in [m]$ 

 $\begin{array}{ll} X_{s_i}^* := \arg\min_{x_{s_i} \in X_{s_i}} f_{s_i}(x_{s_i}) & \quad & \texttt{Vnivariate optimization problem } * \\ \mathscr{F}_{s_i}^* := \bigcup_{x_{s_i} \in X_{s_i}^*} (X_{s_i}^*)^{-1}(x_{s_i}) & \quad & \texttt{Vsivariate optimization problem } * \\ \texttt{if } i \leq m \end{array}$ 

$$X_{s_{i+1}} := \left\{ d_{s_{i+1}} - h_{s_{i+1}}^T z \mid z \in \mathscr{F}_{s_i}^* \right\}.$$

end if

end for

return  $\mathscr{F}^*_{s_m} ~ \ \ \$  Theorem. Any member of  $\mathscr{F}^*_{s_m}$  is a Pareto optimal point \*

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Denote the index set of the sorted set by  $\{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}$  such that  $|X|_{s_1} \ge \cdots \ge |X|_{s_m}$ . for  $i \in [m]$ 

 $\begin{array}{ll} X_{s_i}^* := \arg\min_{x_{s_i} \in X_{s_i}} f_{s_i}(x_{s_i}) & \quad & \texttt{`s' univariate optimization problem *} \\ \mathscr{F}_{s_i}^* := \bigcup_{x_{s_i} \in X_{s_i}^*} (X_{s_i}^*)^{-1}(x_{s_i}) & \quad & \texttt{`s univariate optimization problem *} \\ \texttt{if } i \leq m \end{array}$ 

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Denote the index set of the sorted set by  $\{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}$  such that

### Numerical Example: 16 Players



#### A multi-player transportation problem

- 5 nodes, 16 arcs
- Nodes 2, 4 are retail centers
- Nodes 1, 3 are warehouses
- Node 5 transshipment node
- Products need to be shipped from warehouses to retail centers
- · Arcs represent different modes of shipment from one node to another and carried out by different organization
- Cost of a certain type of shipment depends on the number of products shipped



b = (9, -13, 15, -11), u = (5, 6, 6, 10, 10, 7, 11, 13, 16, 12, 4, 5, 6, 14, 13, 15)

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### Pareto Optimal Solutions



#### A multi-player transportation problem

- 5 nodes, 16 arcs
- Nodes 2, 4 are retail centers
- Nodes 1, 3 are warehouses
- Node 5 transshipment node
- Products need to be shipped from warehouses to retail centers
- Arcs represent different modes of shipment from one node to another and carried out by different organization
- Cost of a certain type of shipment depends on the number of products shipped

The Pareto optimal points are

#### and

(1,3,5,6,11,10,2,1,3,7,7,6).

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- Methodology is numerically efficient when  $m < \frac{n}{2}$ .
- Calculating Groebner basis can be numerically challenging for very large system.
- Based on structure of the network it may happen that 𝔅 is empty ⇒ penalty based approach.

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## Thank You! Questions?

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### Cost Functions

Player	Cost function	
1	$-\frac{\frac{x_1^4}{30}-\frac{13x_1^3}{15}+\frac{259x_1^2}{30}-\frac{263x_1}{15}+1}{15}$	
2	$\frac{77 x_2^5}{120} - \frac{247 x_2^4}{24} + \frac{471 x_2^3}{8} - \frac{3365 x_2^2}{24} + \frac{6779 x_2}{60} + 1$	
3	$\frac{47 \times \frac{4}{3}}{24} - \frac{133 \times \frac{3}{3}}{4} + \frac{4897 \times \frac{2}{3}}{24} - \frac{2123 \times _{3}}{4} + 485$	
4	$\frac{323 \times \frac{5}{4}}{3360} - \frac{2179 \times \frac{4}{4}}{1120} + \frac{47393 \times \frac{3}{4}}{3360} - \frac{48709 \times \frac{2}{4}}{1120} + \frac{7885 \times _4}{168} + 5$	
5	(x <sub>5</sub> -1) <sup>2</sup>	
6	$-\frac{\times_{6}^{4}}{8}+\frac{25\times_{6}^{3}}{12}-\frac{71\times_{6}^{2}}{8}+\frac{95\times_{6}}{12}+10$	
7	x7-5	
8	$\frac{11x_8^7}{1260} - \frac{7x_8^6}{36} + \frac{119x_8^5}{72} - \frac{479x_8^6}{72} + \frac{4609x_8^3}{360} - \frac{803x_8^2}{72} + \frac{155x_8}{28} + 1$	
9	$-\frac{15}{16} \times_9^3 + \frac{365 \times_9^2}{16} - \frac{2865 \times_9}{16} + \frac{7315}{16}$	
10	(×10-10) <sup>2</sup>	
11	$\frac{5 \times \frac{4}{11}}{6} - \frac{35 \times \frac{31}{11}}{3} + \frac{355 \times \frac{2}{11}}{6} - \frac{370 \times 11}{3} + 90$	
12	$\frac{5 \times \frac{4}{12}}{6} - \frac{25 \times \frac{3}{12}}{3} + \frac{175 \times \frac{2}{10}}{6} - \frac{110 \times 12}{3} + 15$	
13	$\frac{5 \times \frac{4}{3}}{6} - 15 \times \frac{3}{13} + \frac{595 \times \frac{2}{13}}{6} - 280 \times \frac{1}{13} + 285$	
14	$\frac{\frac{5 \times \frac{4}{14}}{6} - \frac{85 \times \frac{3}{14}}{3} + \frac{2155 \times \frac{2}{14}}{6} - \frac{6020 \times 14}{3} + 4165$	

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Multi-player minimum cost flow

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### Cost Functions

Player	Cost function	
15	x <sub>15</sub> -7	
16	$\begin{cases} x_{16}+1, \\ 0, \\ (x_{16}+1)^3, \\ -\frac{x_{16}^3}{2}+\frac{13x_{16}^2}{2}-\frac{244x_{16}}{3}+330, \end{cases}$	if $0 \le x_{16} \le 3$ if $4 \le x_{16} \le 6$ if $7 \le x_{16} \le 9$ else

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### A Generic Network



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### The Minimum Cost Flow Problem

- There is a *directed connected graph* that represents the network.
- There is *flow* of some commodity along the arcs of the graphs.
- Each arc incurs a *cost* depending on the amount of flow.
- The flow is often taken to be *integral*.
- The goal is to *minimize the total cost* of all flows subject to the *network constraints*.

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